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CASE NOTES
affirmatively to clarify the relationship between state trade secret
law and federal patent policy." In light of this, it is submitted that a
definitive determination by the Supreme Court of the permissible
parameters of state trade secret law in light of the federal patent law
is necessary to alleviate the uncertainty under which trade secret-
dependent industries now operate. 62
 Since the Second Circuit's
approach—retention of state trade secret law and the protection it
affords—appears to be most reasonable and responsive to industrial
realities, it is further submitted that such determination should be
made in favor of recognizing that vigorous state trade secret law can
coexist with federal patent law and is compatible with both the
constitutional patent policy and the exercise of the patent power by
Congress.
RANDOLPH H. ELKINS
Securities—Insiders' Liability Under Section I6(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act for Stock Transfer After Corporate Merger—Kern
County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. ' —On May 8,
1967, Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Occidental) announced a
tender offer to purchase 500,000 shares of the stock of Kern County
Land Company (Old Kern). 2 The tender offer expired June 8, 1967.
Occidental offered to buy at a price roughly one-third higher than
the current market price.' Within two days Occidental had received
more than 500,000 shares. It extended its offer, and by June 30
owned 887,549 shares. 4 In the course of this period, Occidental
"' A recent Senate bill that would have expressly rejected federal preemption of trade
secret law failed in committee. See R. Milgrim, supra note 8, § 7.08, at 7-70.8(2) n.56.26,
7-70.8(17) n.56.28 for background. On the other hand, Congress has not seen fit, in the
present laws or elsewhere, to assert such preemption, and in fact has recognized the need for
trade secret protection in numerous acts setting guidelines for their handling by administrative
bodies. See R. Milgrim, supra, ch. 6 for an extensive discussion of the federal acts referring to
trade secrets.
62 The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari, 94 S. Ct. 70, 42 U.S.L.W, 3194 (U.S.
Oct. 9, 1973) (No. 187).
' 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
2 Occidental had previously attempted a merger with Old Kern, but had been rejected by
Kern's board. Occidental made the tender bid in the hope that ownership of a large block of
stock would make Old Kern amenable to merger. Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 323
F. Supp. 570, 572-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
After the reorganization which followed, Kern County Land Co. became known as 600
California Corp. until its dissolution on Oct, 6, 1967, 411 U.S. at 584 n.2. Kern County Land
Co, (New Kern), a Delaware corporation, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Tenneco Corp.,
itself a wholly owned subsidiary of Tenneco, Inc. Id. at 586 & n.10.
3 Old Kern closed at 633's on the last trading day before the tender offer; Occidental
offered $83.50 plus $1.50 brokerage payment. 411 U.S. at 584, 585 n.5.
4 This figure included 1900 shares which Occidental had purchased on the open market
in April 1967. 323 F. Stipp. at 573-74. "Beneficial ownership" status was not asserted as to
those shares. 411 U.S. at 585 n.7.
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became a "beneficial owner" under section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19345
 (i.e., owner of ten percent of the outstanding
shares) of Old Kern and therefore became liable for any profits on
trading activity in Old Kern which might occur before Occidental
had held these shares for six months.
Old Kern's management twice asked its stockholders to refrain
from selling to Occidental 6 and, feeling that the Occidental offer
undervalued its stock, entered into negotiations with Tenneco. It
announced a "defensive" merger' with the conglomerate on May 19.
The merger provided for conversion on a one-for-one basis of Old
Kern shares for a new Tenneco preference issue, 8 which was freely
convertible into 3.6 shares of Tenneco common stock. 9
 That same
day, Occidental estimated the new Tenneco preference to be worth
$105 per share."
Worried by its significant minority position in Tenneco resulting
from its purchase of Old Kern shares, Occidental signed an agree-
ment with Tenneco on June 2, 1967, whereby Tenneco took a
refundable "call" option on Occidental's shares of Old Kern." Occi-
dental simultaneously sought promulgation from the SEC of a new
rule, which Occidental termed "proposed Rule 166-11." This rule
would have provided an exemption from section 16(b) liability for
corporations attempting takeover, where the takeover attempt had
been foiled by a defensive merger, such as the Old Kern-Tenneco
merger.' 2
 Occidental feared that the consummation of the Old
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). For the text of § 16(b), see note 34 infra.
6
 Pleas to hold shares occurred once by mail when the original tender offer was made,
and later by telegram when Occidental renewed its offer. 411 U.S. at 585.
7
 A defensive merger is accomplished when the company under attack, here Old Kern,
agrees to merge with a corporation other than the one which is attempting takeover by means
of its tender offer. See Schmults & Kelly, Cash Take-Over Bids—Defense Tactics, 23 Bus.
Law. 115 (1967).
A company under seige by a tender offer may be willing to merge defensively for several
reasons. Often, existing management can protect its employment position and policies through
a negotiated merger but not in the unfriendly takeover situation. In the case of the Old
Kern-Tenneco merger, price played a major role: Tenneco offered stock worth $105 for each
share of Old Kern. This was $20 more per share than the Occidental tender bid. In addition,
by offering a stock trade rather than a purchase for cash, Tenneco held out the inviting
prospect of a ruling from the Internal Revenue Service characterizing the transaction as a
tax-free exchange. This tax advantage, which was later realized, clearly could not accrue to
the Occidental offering for cash. 411 U.S. at 586 n.11. For a discussion of tender offers in
general, see E. Aranow & H. Einhorn, Tender Offers for Corporate Control (1973).
11
 This was not an issue of preferred stock, but a particularized issue designed solely to be
convertible with Old Kern common stock on a one-for-one basis, and to be convertible into
3.6 shares of Tenneco common. 323 F. Supp. at 575.
411 U.S. at 586 n.11.
ID
 Id. at 586.
" Id. at 587. Tenneco wished to rid itself of a potentially disruptive stockholder in
Occidental. The option was operative only after Dec. 9, 1967.
12
 The SEC declined to promulgate "proposed Rule 16b-11," despite its grant of a formal
hearing on Aug. 29, 1967. 323 F. Supp. at 577. Rule 16b-11, adopted in SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8229 (Jan. 17, 1968), effective Feb. 2, 1968, 17 C.F.R.
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Kern-Tenneco merger might constitute a "sale" of Occidental's Old
Kern stock within the meaning of section 16(13).' 3 Occidental also
sought to delay the Old Kern-Tenneco merger beyond the six month
statutory limit by inspiring a series of delaying suits by Old Kern
shareholders.' 4 These "oppressive and vexatious" suits, as the court
termed them,I 5 did not interfere with the merger plans. The merger
was concluded on August 30, 1967, when Old Kern's assets were
transferred to New Kern. At this time Occidental became irreversi-
bly bound to accept Tenneco's new preference shares in return for
its Old Kern common. k 6
Occidental delayed tendering its Old Kern stock until December
11, 1967, but then received its Tenneco preference shares. Acting
under the June 2 option agreement, Tenneco immediately redeemed
the shares for a total payment of $93,905,415. Occidental also re-
ceived dividend payments totalling $1,793,439.22. 17
New Kern and various Tenneco stockholders' groups claimed
for Tenneco the profits made by Occidental in the transaction in a
suit brought in the Southern District of New York.' 8 The district
court found that the merger of Old Kern with Tenneco and the
exchange of Tenneco preference stock for Old Kern common consti-
tuted a "sale" within the meaning of section 16(b), and ordered
Occidental as a beneficial owner of Old Kern to disgorge the profits
on the sale, an amount which totalled $1,712,980.' 9 The court
reasoned that Occidental's voluntary acquisition of more than 10
percent of Old Kern's common implied a voluntary acceptance of all
obligations and burdens of a statutory insider. 20 The district court,
in a supplementary opinion, awarded the dividends to New Kern. 2 '
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and granted summary
judgment for Occidental. 22
 The court rejected both of New Kern's
240.16b-11(1973), deals with the sale of subscription rights and has no relation to
Occidental's proposal of June-Sept. 1967.
13
 This was one of the theories before the district court in Abrams. The court held a sale
did occur. 323 F. Supp. at 580.
' 4 The stockholder group of plaintiffs
has been determined to keep multiforum litigation going constantly over a wide-
spread area for the purpose of delaying the consummation of the plan, if not to
defeat it, knowing all the time that they had no chance of winning the litigation.
600 California Corp. v. Harjean Co., 284 F. Supp. 843, 856 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
'' Id. at 861.
" 411 U.S. at 589.
' 7 Id.
18 Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 323 F. Supp, 570, 579 (1972),
19
 Id. at 580.
29 Id. at 582.
Id.
22
 Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157, 165 (2d Cir. 1971). The grant
of summary judgment was made despite the fact that Occidental had not requested summary
judgment below.
Justice Douglas, in his dissent on appeal to the Supreme Court, complains about this
direct entry of summary judgment for Occidental by the Second Circuit:
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contentions: that Occidental had "sold" its shares of Old Kern on
August 30 when it became irrevocably entitled to Tenneco prefer-
ence stock; and that the option agreement of June 2 had constituted
a "sale" within the meaning of section 16(b). 23 The court, speaking
through Judge Friendly, found that the "sale" occurred upon exer-
cise of the June 2 option. 24
 This took place on December 11.
Expanding its reasoning to focus on the delineated concerns of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 25
 the Second Circuit reasoned that
Occidental at no time had any information concerning Old Kern
which could have led to speculative abuse. 26 Occidental had no
possible access to inside information despite the statutory inferences
raised by its beneficial owner status; it did not know that Old Kern's
management would be able to negotiate a merger realizing prices
$20 per share higher than Occidental's offer and free from capital
gains tax. 27
The Supreme Court granted certiorari ." to consider whether a
section 16(b) "sale" occurs when the target of a tender offer defends
itself by merging with a third company and the tender offeror then
exchanges his stock for stock in the third company, at the same time
granting a• purchase option on that stock which may be exercised
only after the six month period has expired. 29 In a six to three
decision, 3° the Court HELD: when a beneficial owner of ten percent
or more of the stock in a corporation is incapable of possessing any
inside information concerning the corporation and is therefore un-
able to engage in the kind of speculative abuse which section 16(b)
was designed to prevent, then neither the granting of an option to
purchase such stock, nor the fact that such beneficial owner becomes
irrevocably bound to exchange his shares for those in another corpo-
Even if it can be justified in the most limited circumstances—for example, where the
record below left no doubt whatsoever that the nonmoving party was entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law—this is not such a case.
411 U.S. at 614 (dissenting opinion). The majority opinion is silent on the matter.
33 450 F.2d at 161-62.
24
 This event had been fixed under the terms of the option contract to occur after Dec. 9,
1967, six months and one day after Occidental's last contemplated acquisition of Old Kern
common. Id. at 160.
25 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-111 (1970). See text at note 34 infra.
26 450 F.2d at 165. New Kern argued that Tenneco had been pressured by Occidental,
who was able to use its large holdings to extort a high redemption price from Tenneco. Judge
Friendly rejected this argument, noting that the option price of $105 was precisely what
Occidental's advisor, Lehman Brothers, had said the preference issue was worth, and that the
option was merely
a straight-forward business arrangement between one company that found itself in
the undesired position of becoming "locked in" as a large minority stockholder and a
second company that was eager to remove the threat thus imposed, if economic
circumstances permitted.
ld. (footnote omitted).
27 Id. at 163.
" 405 U.S. 1064 (1972).
24 411 U.S. at 584.
3° Id. at 582.
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ration, constitutes a "sale" of those shares within the meaning of
section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 31
Occidental provides clarification to the 1972 case of Reliance
Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co. 32 That decision appeared on its
face to approve an "objective" approach to section 16(b) litigation
over the "subjective" approach which had been dominant in the
lower courts for some time. 33 In Occidental the Supreme Court
provided its endorsement of the subjective approach. This note will
describe the function of section 16(b) and will then trace the de-
velopment of case law concerning the statute culminating in Occi-
dental. It will be submitted that Reliance and Occidental are both
good law and must be read together; that despite the narrowness of
the actual holding in Occidental, the primary theoretical problem
concerning section 16(b) has been resolved by this case; and that
future litigation will focus on questions of fact rather than questions
of law.
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 34 was
enacted to prevent unfair use of inside information by statutory
insiders. 35 To that end, corporate insiders are required to surrender
to the issuing corporation any profits realized from the purchase and
sale, or sale and purchase, of an equity security of such issuer within
any period of less than six months. Congress included the section in
the New Deal regulation of the stock markets because of conspicu-
31 Id. at 599-600.
32 404 U.S. 418 (1972). For a discussion of the interpretive problems surrounding
Emerson, see, e.g., Note, 14 13.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev, 560 (1973); Note, Reliance Electric
and 16(b) Litigation: A Return to the Objective Approach?, .58 Va. L. Rev. 907 (1972).
3 ' See text following note 45 infra.
34
 t5 U.S.C. § 78p(b} (1970). Section 16 provides in part:
§ 16(b). For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relation-
ship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale
and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security)
within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good
faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recover-
able by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased
or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to
recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name
and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within
sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no
suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was realized.
This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial
owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and
purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the
Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the
purpose of this subsection.
15 These are defined as a "beneficial owner, director, or officer." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1970). The term "beneficial owner" refers to one who owns "more than 10 per centum of any
class of any equity security (other than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant to
[§ 12(g) of the Exchange Act] . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
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ous evidence that insiders were able to take advantage of informa-
tion not available to the general investing public. 36 In the
"garden-variety"37
 purchase and sale (or sale and purchase) within
six months, section 16(b) acts as a "crude rule of thumb" 38 to return
more or less mechanically any profits made by an insider. Major
problems in interpreting section 16(b) have arisen from the fact that
the statutory definitions of "purchase" and "sale" are broad, impre-
cise and ultimately tautological."
The early cases presented few interpretive problems. In
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.," the defendant-directors of Oldetyme
Distillers Corporation bought and sold for cash large blocks of
Oldetyme common stock within a six month period. The directors
were held liable, although no showing was made that inside infor-
mation had been misused." This is perhaps the simplest example of
the 16(b) situation and consequently is most prone to mechanistic or
objective application of 16(b) sanctions.
Fact patterns after Smolowe became increasingly complex,
probably as a result of corporate attempts to avoid liability. Trans-
actions were frequently of an "unorthodox" 42 variety; they involved
such noncash transfers as the exercise of options and warrants to
purchase stock, conversions of convertible securities, and transac-
tions in stock pursuant to mergers, reclassifications or reorganiza-
tions. For example, in Park & Tilford, Mc. v. Schulte, 43 the
defendant-directors voluntarily converted their shares of preferred
stock into its conversion common and, within six months, sold the
common. At the time of conversion, the common was experiencing a
"spectacular rise" due to a rumor that the corporation, controlled
by the defendants, was about to pay a dividend in liquor. The
36
 Included in this exploitation were the "betrayal of . . . fiduciary duties by directors and
officers of corporations" and the "unscrupulous employment of inside information by large
stockholders." Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, Stock Exchange Practices, S. Rep,
No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934). Also included were manipulations of market prices
by artificial means by such corporate insiders as the President of the New York Stock
Exchange, the chief executive officer of the Chase National Bank and the Chairman of the
Board of the National City Bank. See generally Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404
U.S. 418, 428-31 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
37 450 F.2d at 162.
34
 Statement of Thomas G. Corcoran, Administration spokesman, in Hearings on S.R.
84 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6557 (1934).
The applicable definitions are: "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' include any contract to
buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1970). "The terms 'sale' and 'sell'
each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1970).
40
 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
4 ' 136 F.2d at 236. There is considerable belief that Rule
. 10b-5 is a better instrument to
control insider speculation in unorthodox "purchase and sale" situations than is § 16(b). Rule
10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973), which governs actual misuse of inside information, was
not adopted until 1948. Its present form was adopted in 1951. See, e.g., Lowenfels, Section
16(b): A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 Cornell L, Rev. 45 (1968).
47
 The term is from 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1069 (2d ed. 1961).
4 ' 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947).
44
 Id. at 986.
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Second Circuit declared that this conversion was voluntary, and was
therefore a "purchase" of the common stock, and that section 16(b)
liability therefore accrued. 45
The test which Judge Clark laid down in his opinion in Park &
Tilford was a mechanical one: "Defendants did not own the common
stock in question before they exercised their option to convert; they
did afterward. Therefore they acquired the stock, within the mean-
ing of the Act."46
This mechanical test is easy to apply in a context like that of
Smolowe, where there is little question that a "purchase and sale"
has taken place: the transactions in Smolowe were for cash. For this
reason, cash transactions—orthodox "purchases and sales"—are
rarely litigated under section 16(b). 47 The Park & Tilford fact situa-
tion, however, presents far more difficult questions. The Second
Circuit first recognized that the unorthodox transactions test could
present fact problems when it decided Roberts v. Eaton." In Eaton,
the Eaton family, owners of 45.9 percent of the outstanding shares
of $5 par value common stock of Old Town Corporation, engineered
the reclassification of the outstanding shares of the stock into an
equal number of shares of $1 par value common and $7 par value
preferred. This reclassification, which increased marketability, was
approved by 78 percent of the shareholders and was made in well-
publicized contemplation of the retirement of the Eaton family from
the business. Two months after reclassification, the Eatons liquid-
ated their holdings. 49
 The Second Circuit declined to follow the rule
it had established in Park & Tilford, which would have required
finding that the Eatons had "acquired" the new $1 par value com-
mon and $7 par value preferred, and had therefore "purchased" it.
Instead, the court, again speaking through Judge Clark, applied a
"subjective" test and held that "[t]he reclassification at bar could not
possibly lend itself to the speculation encompassed in § 16(b). This
being so, it was not a 'purchase'. . . .""
The facts in Park & Tilford and Eaton exemplify the increasing
complexity of post
-Smolowe section 16(b) litigation, which has fo-
cused in the last twenty years more on unorthodox transactions than
upon orthodox purchases and sales for cash. Most courts, 51 con-
45 Id. at 987-88.
46 Id. at 987.
47
 The only recent exception is Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418
(1972).
46
 2!2 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1954).
44
 Id. at 83.
SU
 Id. at 86.
51
 The only recent exception is the Third Circuit, which ruled en banc in Heli-Coil v.
Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965), that the conversion by a corporate officer of debentures
into common stock and the subsequent sale of the common stock within six months was a
"purchase and sale" within the meaning of § 16(b). The Third Circuit, concluding that
"Congress intended the test to be an entirely objective one," id. at 165, adopted the test of
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fronted with unorthodox transactions, have adopted the subjective
approach to such transactions. The standard formulation of the
subjective test was enunciated by Judge, now Mr. Justice, Stewart 52
in 1958 in Ferraiolo v. Newman. 53
 Speaking for the Sixth Circuit
and adopting the test recommended eight years before in the Yale
Law Journa1, 54
 Judge Stewart said that "every transaction which
can reasonably be defined as a purchase will be so defined, if the
transaction is of a kind which can possibly lend itself to the specula-
tion encompassed by Section 16(b)." 55
Using this test, the court found that the conversion by a non-
active director of Ashland Oil of his long-held shares of preferred
stock into common, in order to avoid a $9 per share loss, followed
by the sale of the common, did not constitute a "purchase and sale"
within the meaning of section 16(b). The court emphasized that 101
of the preferred shareholders were treated alike; full disclosure was
made to them; the conversion worked no material change in the
proportional equity ownership of Ashland." 56
Accepting the reasoning of Ferraiolo, the Ninth Circuit in Blau
v. Max Factor & Co. 57
 suggested that an "initial inquiry" 58 into the
purposes of section 16(b) must be made before the section is rigidly
applied. In Max Factor, family members owning the corporation
converted a portion of their holdings from Class A stock into com-
mon prior to the planned and publicized sale of the common. The
Class A shares had been created thirteen years before, when Max
Factor went public, to enable the formerly family-held corporation
to pay maximum dividends to non-family stockholders while retain-
ing the earnings of family stockholders for use in the business,
concurrently avoiding additional tax liability for the family. The
Class A shares were freely convertible into common. The court
reasoned that the acquisition of the common by this means was not
a purchase and that the application of section 16(b) to this unor-
thodox transaction would be contrary to the intent of the
legislation," and would constitute "purposeless harshness." 6°
Blau v. Lamb 6 ' involved similar stock conversion questions.
Park & Tilford and declined to consider whether speculative abuse was possible in the
conversion. Id. at 173.
53 It is particularly curious to note that Mr. Justice Stewart, although the formulator of
what has become the classic subjective test, is among the dissenters in Occidental, concurring
with Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion that the majority's "ad hoc analysis . . . undermines the
congressional purpose." 411 U.S. at 605 (dissenting opinion).
53
 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
54
 Comment, The Scope of "Purchase and Sale" under Section 16(b) of the Exchange
Act, 59 Yale L.J. 510, 513 (1950).
35
 259 F.2d at 345.
56
 Id. at 346.
57
 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1965).
58
 Id. at 307.
59
 Id. at 309.
6° Id. at 307.
61
 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966).
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That case concerned a complicated series of transactions in the
convertible preferred and common stock of Air-Way Industries,
Inc., which had been carried on by Edward Lamb Enterprises, Inc.,
and by Lamb personally in 1955. 62 The Second Circuit adopted a
subjective standard for applying section 16(b) to this conversion
transaction "which could not possibly serve as a vehicle for any of
the abuses at which Section 16(b) was aimed." 63 The court upheld
what it termed "a well-known rule of construction: cessante ratione
legis, cessat et ipsa lex,"64
 and thereby invalidated an objective
application of section 16(b) without a prior examination of the facts
of the transaction.
A year later, the Eighth Circuit in Petteys v. Butler 65 decided
another conversion case. The court adopted the subjective test and
ruled that a non-controlling director's conversion of his convertible
preferred shares into equivalent common shares was not a section
16(b) "purchase." The court ruled that directors were not account-
able for profits made on the sale of the conversion security within six
months, primarily because the corporation had ordered redemption
on such terms that nearly all stockholders chose conversion and
enjoyed the same benefits as the directors. 66
Although there has been strong objection to adopting the sub-
jective test, 67 the courts have increasingly done so, looking to the
stated purpose of section 16(b)—"preventing the unfair use of infor-
mation which may have been obtained by [an insider]" 68—in deter-
mining the applicability of the section. The lower courts had largely
concluded, with one notable exception, 69
 that where there is no
possibility of violation of this purpose by the transaction under
consideration, section 16(b) should not be applied, since the opera-
62
 Id. at 512-13.
63 Id. at 516.
64
 Id. Freely translated: If the reason for a law has ceased to exist, the law itself is
inapplicable.
65 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966). Petteyr. is notable for the dissent of Judge, now Mr.
Justice, Blackmun, which typifies a reluctance in accepting the subjective test:
[E]ither the statute means what it literally says or . . . it does not; . , if Congress
had intended to provide additional exceptions, it would have done so in clear
language; and , the recognized purpose and aim of the statute are more consis-
tently and protectively to be served if the statute is construed literally and objectively
rather than non-literally and subjectively on a case-by-case basis. The latter inevita-
bly is a weakening process.
Id. at 538 (dissenting opinion).
66
 Id. at 537. The question whether conversion of securities ever presents a § 16(b)
liability has since been answered by the SEC in Rule 16b-9: the conversion of a convertible
security into its conversion security is not comprehended within the purpose of § 16(b). 17
C.F.R. § 240.16U-9 (1973).
67
 See note 65 supra. However, like Mr. Justice Stewart (see note 52 supra), Mr. Justice
Blackmun seems to have reversed himself since leaving the Eighth Circuit and joining the
Supreme Court. Blackmun voted with the majority in Occidental.
68 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). For full text, see note 34 supra.
69
 Heli-Coil Corp, v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
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tive portions of the section are only an enforcement procedure for
the language in the statement of purpose."
Analysis of the problem of section 16(b) liability has followed
the following order when a court accepts the subjective test: (1) Is
there an orthodox "purchase and sale" or "sale and purchase" of an
equity security by a corporate insider within the statutory six
months? (If so, liability clearly accrues.) (2) If there was no orthodox
"purchase and sale" or "sale and purchase," was there a possibility
for speculative abuse present in the transaction? (If not, liability
does not accrue.) (3) If a possibility for speculative abuse was pres-
ent in an unorthodox transaction, was there a "purchase and sale" or
"sale and purchase" of an equity security by a corporate insider
within the statutory six months? (If so, liability accrues just as in an
orthodox sale for cash.) The courts which have adopted the subjec-
tive test have all considered the problem in the above order. The
court in Max Factor posed as an "initial inquiry"" the question of
speculative abuse in an unorthodox transaction; the court in New-
mark v. RKO General, Inc. 72 'raised as the "threshold issue" the
question of whether speculative abuse was possible. 73
It was against this background of a general trend toward the
subjective approach74 that the Supreme Court decided Reliance
Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co." in 1972. The facts of Emer-
son are at first glance similar to those in Occidental, and the two
cases must be read together. Emerson acquired 13.2 percent of the
stock of Dodge Manufacturing Company in a takeover attempt.
Dodge defensively merged with Reliance, leaving Emerson in a
position analogous to that of Occidental in the Old Kern-Tenneco
merger. Emerson thereupon sold enough shares of Dodge to bring its
holdings down to 9.96 percent, and two weeks later (also within the
statutory six month period) sold its remaining shares. 76
The Court ruled that Emerson's liability under section 16(b)
encompassed the first sale, but not the second. By selling enough
shares to become owner of less than ten percent of the shares of
Dodge, Emerson had ceased to be a "beneficial owner" under section
16(b). The two-step selldown procedure was upheld as technically
legal, despite its being part of a single plan to dispose of the Dodge
shares."
7° See Lowenfels, supra note 41, at 58.
71 342 F.2d at 307.
7 ' 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1970). Newmark involved the merger of Central Airlines, Inc.
into Frontier Airlines, Inc., the latter 56%-owned by RKO General. Considerable profits
accrued to RKO, reflecting the difference between the purchase price of Central securities and
their market value in the equivalent in Frontier shares on the date of the merger.
73
 Id. at 353.
74 Comment, Stock Exchanges Pursuant to Corporate Consolidation: A Section 16(13)
"Purchase or Sale"?, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1034, 1039 & n.28 (1969).
75 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
76 Id. at 420-21. The first sale left Emerson the owner of less than the ten percent
holdings which constitute the statutory definition of a "beneficial owner."
77 Id. at 425. The Eighth Circuit had compared the procedure to permissible tax
158
CASE NOTES
The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Stewart, declared that
"where alternative constructions of the terms of § 16(b) are possible,
those terms are to be given the construction that best serves_ the
congressional purpose of curbing short swing speculation by corpo-
rate insiders." 78 The statutory definition of "beneficial owner" gives
no room for alternative construction; by disposing of a portion of its
holding, Emerson had ceased to be a beneficial owner. Equally, the
cash sale by Emerson left no question that this was an orthodox sale
by a beneficial owner—completely within section 16(b). If the
three-question subjective test is applied to the facts of the first sale
in Emerson, the first answer is that there is an orthodox sale, and
questions two and three concerning the possibility of speculative
abuse and actual sale within six months are never reached. When
the second sale is considered, it becomes clear that there is no
section 16(b) problem or orthodox sale because Emerson had ceased
to be a statutory insider. Questions two and three are inapplicable in
both cases since the sales in Emerson were for cash and both
questions are dependent upon a negative answer to the first ques-
tion.
The critical difference between Emerson and Occidental is that
the latter was an unorthodox transaction, which led the Court to
examine the facts of the case rather than characterizing the events as
a section 16(b) infraction as a matter of law. The former case
involved an orthodox transaction, and the Supreme Court never
reached the question of the possibility of speculative abuse. That
question is reached under the subjective test if and only if there
exists some question as to whether a "purchase and sale" or "sale
and purchase" has taken place. The definition of beneficial owner-
ship, and the requirement that a beneficial owner be such both at
the time of purchase and of the sale, or vice versa, are not subject to
any subjective inquiry. The Emerson court was thus unable to apply
a subjective interpretation, despite favorable comments concerning
that test: the facts in Emerson—an actual and immediate sale for
cash—require a mechanistic application of section 16(b) under any
test. On the other hand, if the three-question subjective test is
applied to the Occidental facts, the first question of the existence of
a cash sale is answered negatively; the second question regarding the
possibility of speculative abuse is answered negatively; and the third
question regarding a "purchase and sale" or "sale and purchase" is
never reached.
The crucial issue presented in complex stock transactions where
section 16(b) liability might accrue under the subjective test is the
question of speculative abuse. In Occidental, Tenneco attempted
unsuccessfully to rely upon a superficially similar case, Bershad v.
avoidance schemes. Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918, 925 (8th Cir.
1970).
7" 404 U.S. at 424.
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McDonough," in which the Seventh Circuit applied the subjective
test to an option contract fact situation and found section 16(b)
liability present. Under the facts in that case, McDonough and his
wife had purchased in March 1967 more than ten percent of the
outstanding shares of Cudahy Company. Soon thereafter he became
a director and chairman of the board. In July 1967 they sold an
"option" on their shares; the option was exercised a week after the
statutory six month period expired. The defendants argued that the
July sale was simply an option. However, McDonough had resigned
from the board in July and was replaced by his "optionee;" he
granted an irrevocable proxy to the optionee; and the option price of
fourteen percent of total purchase price was not returnable. On the
basis of these facts, the Seventh Circuit declared that "[t]he circum-
stances of the transaction clearly indicate that the stock was effec-
tively transferred, for all practical purposes, long before the exercise
of the option." 8° By granting voting control subsequent to the op-
tion, sufficient control had passed from the eventual seller's hands to
suggest an actual sale. 81 Occidental presents no such maneuvers.
The option was genuine and granted no control to Tenneco; at the
same time, the merger presented no possibility of inside knowledge
and therefore no possibility of speculative abuse by Occidental. An
application of the subjective approach's threshold question of the
possibility for speculation thus relieved Occidental of any liability
under section 16(b).
The importance of the reasoning used in Occidental cannot be
overestimated. Although the holding itself is tied to a narrow fact
pattern, the test used to reach that holding is applicable to all future
16(b) litigation involving unorthodox transactions. By adopting the
subjective test, the Court has resolved the confusion in the lower
courts over interpretation of section 16(b) by endorsing the approach
taken "[b]y . . . the greater weight of authority."82 It must be
remembered that Occidental's avoidance of section 16(b) liability
was possible only because this was an unorthodox purchase and sale
situation: the Court specifically states by way of dicta that a cash
sale by Occidental "would have been a § 16(b) sale and would have
left Occidental with a prima facie § 16(b) liability." 83 The involun-
tary nature of events with respect to Occidental's position in Old
Kern stock once Tenneco had decided to merge with Old Kern is
also prominent in the Supreme Court's opinion. 84 It should be noted
that Occidental was attacked not only on the basis of its grant of an
option to take effect in six months but also on the ground that the
irrevocable rights to Tenneco preference stock which accrued on
79 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970).
88
 Id. at 698.
81 Id.
82
 411 U.S. at 594 n.26.
83
 Id. at 600.
" Id.
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August 30, standing alone, constituted a section 16(b) violation. The
Court concluded that in light of Occidental's powerless position with
respect to the merger, no section 16(b) liability should accrue merely
from the closing of the merger."
The specificity of the Court's assertion that a cash sale would
have left Occidental with a prima facie section 16(b) liability sug-
gests that the Occidental decision must not in any way be viewed as
overruling Emerson, which provides the standards governing those
situations in which it is obvious that a "purchase" or "sale" has
taken place. In all but the most clear-cut cases of purchase and sale,
the courts must undertake an in-depth analysis of the facts of each
transaction. This analytical requirement has a clear disadvantage.
In dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas complains that the substitution of
the requirement of in-depth analysis of the possibility of abuse for
the objective test's mechanical formula will result in numerous prob-
lems:
Instead of a section that is easy to administer and by its
clear-cut terms discourages litigation, we have instead a
section that fosters litigation because the Court's decision
holds out the hope for the insider that he may avoid § 16(b)
liability. In short, the majority destroys much of the
section's prophylactic effect."
The complaint has some validity. There is little doubt that
opening such questions as the possibility of "speculative abuse" to
judicial inquiry will lead to rulings on the basis of very narrow
questions of fact. On the other hand, the courts' inquiry into the
facts of a case is limited under the Occidental ruling solely to the
question of whether speculative abuse was possible. Refusal to in-
quire would mean, on the facts in Occidental, that the target of a
tender offer could not only solicit a better offer, but could hold out
to the new offeror the bait of section 16(b) liability on the part of the
original offeror, if the transaction could be squeezed through in six
months." This sort of rule would discourage tender offers for more
than ten percent of the target's outstanding shares; since corporate
takeover is difficult under such conditions, far fewer takeovers
would succeed. The policy considerations of that result are beyond
the scope of this note, but since the intent of section 16(b) is to
benefit the stockholders of corporations, it is sufficient to note that
Old Kern's stockholders benefited considerably as a result of
Occidental's takeover attempt.
Adherence to an objective standard would be contrary to the
stated intent of the legislation. The sacrifice of judicial simplicity
which the three-step subjective approach requires is merely inciden-
" Id.
116
 Id. at 612 (dissenting opinion!.
See Abrams, 450 F.2d at 163.64,
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tal to the benefits the three-question test conveys. If criticism is to be
leveled at the Court for its decision in Occidental, it should be
leveled not because of the decision itself, but for the long delay in
reaching it.
It is submitted that the Occidental decision, when read with
Emerson, provides a conclusive answer to the theoretical questions
arising under section 16(b). It may be expected that considerable
litigation will result from the decision, since the "possibility of
speculative abuse" standard is sufficiently vague to allow different
conclusions to be drawn from the same set of facts. In the future,
avoidance of at least a portion of section 16(b) liability will be
relatively easy for the instigator of an unsuccessful attempt at corpo-
rate takeover: he may either sell down in two steps, as in Emerson,
or else negotiate a "call" option with the survivor of the defensive
merger negotiated to block his takeover, as in Occidental. The
choice of which of these alternatives to adopt will depend upon the
defeated tender offeror's assessment of likely future market prices
and his willingness to gamble on the all-or-nothing question of the
possibility of speculative abuse. Since the costs of protracted se-
curities litigation are enormous, and since extended litigation is more
likely in situations similar to Occidental than in those similar to
Emerson, it is to be expected that many future defeated tender
offerors will elect the two-step selldown procedure of Emerson. For
defeated tender offerors, Occidental provides a high-risk alternative
when caught in an untenable position. From the perspective of
enforcement of section 16(b), Occidental provides an affirmation
that the intent of the legislation is far more important than is the
application of the mechanical test established to carry out that
intent.
JOHN K. OLSON
Federal Communications Commission—Review of Regulations Re-
lating to Provision of Data Processing Services by Communications
Common Carriers—GTE Service Corp. v. FCC.'—In 1966 the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) by
formal announcement in a Notice of Inquiry' opened an investiga-
tion into a broad and increasingly significant area of rapid tech-
nological change in our society: the convergence of the data pro-
cessing and communications industries due to increasing needs to
transmit computer-stored data between data processing users in
different places. The Commission was concerned lest the rapid
technological changes in the communications and data processing
474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973 ► .
2
 In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com-
puter and Communication Services and Facilities, 7 F.C.C.2d 11 (1966).
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